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Abstract
This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with nominal wage rigidi-
ties and examines the welfare effects of debt policy during recessions. Issues of public
debt stimulate aggregate consumption demand and create employment. Future gen-
erations then face both increased wage incomes and higher taxes. If the amount
of outstanding bonds is already large, debt policy deteriorates the welfare of future
generations by levying heavy taxes. By contrast, if the outstanding bond issue is
relatively small, debt policy can be Pareto improving by creating more employ-
ment. Therefore, the welfare implications of debt policy during recessions can be
discriminated from those during booms.
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I. Introduction
Tobin (1980) asserts that in conditions of under-employment further issues of pub-
lic debt stimulate aggregate demand and increase output and employment. Inspired by
Tobin, Rankin (1986) demonstrates that when there are demand shortages and unemploy-
ment, such Keynesian debt policy brings higher steady-state social welfare. And more
recently, Ono (2001) contends that, in the context of liquidity traps, current debt issue
never places a burden on future generations. By way of contrast with the Keynesian sce-
nario, Modigliani (1961) argues that debt issue puts a strain on future generations, even
with under-employment situations. Accordingly, whether debt policy during recessions
is beneficial to future generations remains a controversial issue. By introducing nominal
wage rigidities into a monetary overlapping-generations model a` laWeil (1987), this paper
clarifies the welfare implications of debt policy during recessions.
In considering the problem of a burden on future generations of public debt, the
definition of future generations is crucial. According to Lerner (1948), future generations
are defined as people who exist at future dates irrespective of birth dates. On the other
hand, Bowen et al. regard people who were born at the same date as the same generation,
and define future generations as people who will be born after the present date. The
analyses that approach the problem by using overlapping-generations models, including
the current paper, follow the latter definition.1
Another important point involved in analysing this problem is whether the analysis
uses an overlapping-generations model a` la Diamond (1965) or one a` la Blanchard (1985)
and Weil (1987, 1989). In the Diamond model, people undoubtedly die and hence the
1Refer to Iwamoto (2002).
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current generation that enjoys benefit from debt issue never exists at far future dates.
Therefore, the focus of the analysis is mainly drawn to the future level of output. As-
suming full employment, Diamond (1965) shows that debt issue interferes with capital
accumulation and lowers the steady-state level of output and welfare (if the economy is
dynamically efficient). By contrast, developing the Diamond model with fixed prices and
wages, Rankin (1986) finds that debt issue raises the steady-state level of output and
welfare.2 Consequently, in the Diamond situation, debt policy is harmful to future gen-
erations during booms, whereas it is beneficial during recessions (as long as the economy
is dynamically efficient).3
On the other hand, the Blanchard—Weil model examines the situation where the cur-
rent generation exists even at far future dates.4 Then, the literature on the lines of
Blanchard and Weil focuses mainly on the income redistribution effect between different
generations of government policy. As shown in Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989), debt
finance means an income transfer from future generations to existing generations. It is
2Rankin (1986) additionally finds that debt issue reduces welfare despite raising output, if consumers
supply labour elastically and the economy is sufficiently close to Walrasian equilibrium.
3Ono (2001) stresses that debt policy during recessions never places a burden on all future generations
even if the transitional dynamics are considered in the Diamond situation. Sen (2002) points out that,
in the Diamond model with monopolistic competition, debt finance can be Pareto improving depending
on production technology.
4Blanchard assumes that people face a constant instantaneous probability of death throughout their
lifetimes and thus the average rest of lives at some date is identical for all generations. Buiter (1988)
concludes that, in the Blanchard model, the role of finite lifetimes is negligible and the appearance of
new generations is rather more important, like the Weil model. Weil assumes that infinitely-lived agents
appear at a constant rate. One justification of such a situation is primogeniture through inheritance of
bequest. See Weil (1989) for other justifications.
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because part of taxes associated with debt issue is levied on future generations, which are
not connected with existing generations. Based on this intergenerational income redistri-
bution effect, debt policy during booms is beneficial to existing generations and harmful
to future generations (unless the economy is dynamically inefficient).5
The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare implications of debt policy during
recessions in the context of Blanchard and Weil. Taking into account both the inter-
generational income redistribution effect and the existence of unemployment, the result
differs from that of Diamond (1965), Rankin (1986), Blanchard (1985), and Weil (1989).
A further issue of public debt stimulates aggregate consumption demand and decreases
unemployment, thereby supporting the Keynesian scenario. However, future generations
face both this beneficial effect of increased wage incomes and the harmful effect of higher
taxes. If the amount of outstanding bonds is relatively small and there is high population
growth, debt policy enhances the welfare of future generations through creating more
employment and is Pareto improving. Conversely, debt policy diminishes the welfare of
future generations by levying heavy taxes if the outstanding issue is already large.
Section II presents the structure of the model. By using a simplified model without
capital accumulation, Section III clarifies the essence of debt policy during recessions.
Section IV considers capital accumulation. It shows that, as Modigliani (1961) is con-
cerned, debt issue discourages investment and can lead to low levels of steady-state output
if the prevailing interest rate lies at relatively low levels. This possibility barely changes
the prime welfare implication obtained in Section III, because the economy is in dynamic-
5Saint-Paul (1992) also demonstrates that in an endogenous growth model with overlapping gen-
erations and production externalities, debt policy reduces the growth rate and welfare of some future
generations.
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inefficiency at low levels of the interest rate. Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. The Model
II.A. Consumers
The structure of the model is the same as that of Weil (1987), i.e., a hybrid of a money-
in-utility model and an overlapping-generations model. Economy starts at time 0. The
size of initial population is normalized to unity. At each point in time, new infinitely-lived
consumers appear at the rate n(> 0). The total population at time t is hence obtained
as N(t) = ent.
Given the time paths of the real interest rate {r(t)}∞t=s, the nominal interest rate
{R(t)}∞t=s, the real wage rate {w(t)}∞t=s, and the lump-sum tax {τ (s, t)}∞t=s, a consumer
representative of the cohort born at time s(≥ 0) chooses {c(s, t), k(s, t), b(s, t),m(s, t)}∞t=s
to maximize the lifetime utility,
U(s, s) ≡
Z ∞
s
[(1− α) ln c(s, t) + α lnm(s, t)]e−ρ(t−s)dt,(1)
subject to
da(s, t)
dt
= r(t)a(s, t) + w(t)x(s, t)− c(s, t)− R(t)m(s, t)− τ(s, t),(2)
a(s, t) ≡ k(s, t) + b(s, t) +m(s, t),(3)
c(s, t) ≥ 0, m(s, t) ≥ 0,(4)
a(0, 0) > 0, a(s, s) = 0 for ∀s > 0,(5)
lim
t→∞
a(s, t)e−
R t
s r(v)dv ≥ 0,(6)
where ρ(> 0) is the subjective discount rate and c(s, t) is consumption at time t(≥ s) of
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a consumer born at time s.6 Total non-human wealth a(s, t) consists of capital k(s, t),
public bonds b(s, t), and real money balances m(s, t). The constant parameter α satisfies
α ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, labour endowment of each consumer is normalized to unity.
To consider unemployment, however, the realized labour supply is denoted by x(s, t).
Equation (5) indicates that the initial generation is endowed with positive non-human
wealth; whereas, for lack of bequest motives of pre-existing generations, none of new
generations receives non-human wealth at birth.
The first-order conditions are
dc(s, t)
dt
= [r(t)− ρ]c(s, t),(7)
R(t) =
α
1− α
c(s, t)
m(s, t)
,(8)
and the above constraints. Equations (2) and (6)—(8) yield the individual consumption
function
c(s, t) = ρ(1− α)[a(s, t) + h(s, t)],(9)
where h(s, t) is the net human wealth defined as
h(s, t) =
Z ∞
t
[w(z)x(s, z)− τ (s, z)]e−
R z
t r(v)dvdz.(10)
Define the aggregate consumption per capita c(t) as c(t) =
c(0,t)+
R t
0 c(s,t)ne
nsds
N(t)
. Same
definitions hold for other variables: a(t), k(t), b(t), m(t), x(t), τ(t), and h(t). By applying
this aggregation rule to (8) and (9), I have
R(t) =
α
1− α
c(t)
m(t)
,(11)
c(t) = ρ(1− α)[a(t) + h(t)].(12)
6To characterize the instantaneous utility function by a more general CES form does not add further
insights.
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II.B. Production
Using physical capital and labour, competitive firms produce a commodity used for
consumption and investment. Firms have identical production technology. For an-
alytical tractability, the production function is specified by the Cobb-Douglas form:
y(t) = θk(t)βl(t)1−β, which is expressed in aggregate per capita. y(t) is the aggregate
output per capita and l(t) the aggregate labour demand per capita. θ(> 0) and β respec-
tively measure productivity and capital share in output. In particular, this paper assumes
β ∈
£
0, 1
2
¢
of which analytical meaning is presented in Section IV.7 The optimization by
firms provides
r(t) = βθ
∙
k(t)
l(t)
¸β−1
,(13)
w(t) = (1− β)θ
∙
k(t)
l(t)
¸β
.(14)
II.C. Government
The government budget constraint is
db(t)
dt
= [r(t)− n]b(t)− µm(t)− τ(t),(15)
which is expressed in aggregate per capita. µ is the expansion rate of nominal money
supply. This paper assumes µ = n to obtain the steady state of m(t), so that the nominal
value of m(t) remains at M¯(> 0). I omit the role of fiscal spending and distortional taxes
for purpose of comparison with the literature.
Following the existing studies, I characterize debt policy as follows. At time 0, govern-
ment increases the nominal value of b(t) through a helicopter drop; and after time 0, aims
7This range regarding β includes its plausible values used in the standard RBC literature. For example,
King and Rebelo (1999) set β equal to one-thirds.
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to keeping it constant at that value, B¯(> 0).
III. Debt Policy during Recessions
III.A. Simple Setting
To elicit the essence of debt policy during recessions, I establish the following simple
setting. First, throughout this paper, the nominal wage rate is permanently fixed at a
given level, W¯ .8 Hence, unemployment may arise.
Second, throughout the paper, I assume the distribution rule that labour demand and
lump-sum taxes are identical across agents: x(s, t) = min
¡
1, l(t)
¢
and τ (s, t) = τ (t).9
Then, h(s, t) is an age-independent variable: h(s, t) = h(t).
Third, this section imposes β = 0, so that the role of capital accumulation is set aside
and labour is a unique production input. Given the nominal wage rigidity, the commodity
market is in equilibrium if and only if W¯
P (t)
= θ, where P (t) denotes the price level. P (t)
is instantaneously adjusted to satisfy this value, which is henceforth labelled P¯ . As the
inflation rate is always zero, m(t) remains at M¯
P¯
(> 0) and b(t) at B¯
P¯
(> 0). The real interest
rate equals the nominal interest rate: r(t) = R(t).
8For example, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) show nominal price/wage rigidity to arise as a conse-
quence of monopolistic agents’ behaviour in the presence of menu costs. See Mankiw and Romer (1991)
for microfoundations of price/wage rigidities.
9I can employ the age-dependent income schedule used in Blanchard (1985), but it does not alter the
main result of this paper.
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III.B. Steady State and Welfare
Keeping the distribution rule in mind, (2), (5), (8), (10), and (12) together derive the
dynamic equation for c(t),
dc(t)
dt
= [r(t)− ρ]c(t)− ρn(1− α)a(t).(16)
This equation implies that the amount of assets affects aggregate consumption streams
for lack of bequest motives.10 From (11), (16), and a(t) = B¯
P¯
+ M¯
P¯
, the aggregate dynamic
system is characterized by
dr(t)
dt
= r(t)2 − ρr(t)− ρnαB¯ + M¯
M¯
.
As seen in Figure 1, there is a unique steady state, r∗, with r(t) > 0, which is determined
by
r∗2 − ρr∗ − ρnαB¯ + M¯
M¯
= 0.(17)
The steady state associated with r∗ is unstable. If r(t), or equivalently c(t), evolves along
the divergent paths, either the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer or the
non-negativity constraint on consumption is violated. Therefore, r∗ must be chosen at
the initial point in time. In Figure 1, Θ ≡ α
1−α
θP¯
M¯
represents the interest rate associated
with full employment. To take account of unemployment, I set Θ above r∗.
As in Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1987, 1989), the non-negativity on individual con-
sumption requires r∗ ≤ ρ+n.11 Substituting B¯ = 0 into (17) gives the lower bound of r∗,
which is labelled r
¯
∗ and satisfies r
¯
∗ > ρ. As a result, r∗ must be in the following range:
10Refer to Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) for this point.
11From (5) and (9), the non-negativity of individual consumption is satisfied if and only if h(s, s) is
non-negative for all s > 0. Equation (12) implies that h(s, s) ≥ 0 is equivalent to c(t) ≥ ρ(1−α)
³
B¯
P¯
+ M¯
P¯
´
,
which, together with (17), generates this condition.
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Condition 1. r
¯
∗ < r∗ ≤ ρ+ n.
From (15), the steady-state lump-sum tax τ ∗ is
τ ∗ = r∗ B¯
P¯
− n
Ã
B¯
P¯
+
M¯
P¯
!
.(18)
Next, I derive welfare. In the absence of the transition process, substituting (8) into
(1) yields
U(s, s) =
Z ∞
s
ln c(s, t)e−ρ(t−s)dt− αρ ln r
∗ +
α
ρ ln
α
1− α .
The first term in the right-hand side of this equation represents the gross lifetime util-
ity derived from both consumption and holding money. The second term implies the
opportunity costs of holding money. By use of (7) and (9), welfare is reduced to12
U(s, s) =
1
ρ ln r
∗[a(s, s) + h(s, s)]− αρ ln r
∗ +
1
ρ lnα
α(1− α)1−α.(19)
Letting c∗ be the steady-state consumption, h(s, s) is obtained as h(s, s) = c
∗−τ∗
r∗ from
(10) and the equilibrium condition in the commodity market. Equation (19) is eventually
rewritten as
U(s, s) =
1
ρ ln[r
∗a(s, s) + c∗ − τ ∗]− αρ ln r
∗ +
1
ρ lnα
α(1− α)1−α,(20)
which says that the gross lifetime utility is increasing with respect to the net income at
birth, that is, r∗a(s, s) + c∗ − τ ∗.
III.C. Comparative Statics
This subsection examines the effects of an increase in B¯. First, I show its implication
as the Keynesian demand-management policy, which is emphasized by Tobin (1980).
12See e.g., Mino and Shibata (2000) and Saint-Paul (1992) for details of the derivation. In deriving
this formula, I used the approximate expression of ln(1+ ²) = ².
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Lemma 1. Debt policy raises the interest rate.
Proof. Differentiating (17) totally and using Condition 1, I get dr∗
dB¯
= ρnα
(2r∗−ρ)M¯ > 0. ¥
Proposition 1. Debt policy stimulates aggregate consumption demand.
Proof. Use of (11) and Lemma 1 gives dc
∗
dB¯
= ρn(1−α)
(2r∗−ρ)P¯ > 0. ¥
Consideration of the intergenerational income redistribution effect of debt finance is
sufficient to explain this proposition. That is, unless wage income changes, debt policy
increases total wealth of existing generations and decreases that of future generations
through higher taxes. Therefore, existing generations consume more and future genera-
tions less. The total effect on aggregate consumption is definitely positive because part of
future generations that consume less does not yet appear in the economy. Consequently,
the larger amount of assets induces more aggregate consumption demand for lack of a
consumption-smoothing motive across generations. Since the resultant rise in wage in-
come does not disturb this explanation, increasing non-human wealth through debt policy
becomes an effective demand-management policy.
As implied by (20), the level of the net income at birth is crucial for welfare. I next
examine the effect on r∗a(s, s) + c∗ − τ ∗.
Lemma 2. Debt policy raises the net income of the initial generation at birth.
Proof. Taking notice of a(0, 0) = B¯
P¯
+ M¯
P¯
and using (18) and Lemma 1, I get d[r
∗a(0,0)−τ∗]
dB¯
=
M¯
P¯
dr∗
dB¯
+ n
P¯
> 0. Together with Proposition 1, d[r
∗a(0,0)+c∗−τ∗]
dB¯
> 0. ¥
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is also applied to this lemma. Because part of
taxes associated with debt issue is levied on future generations, which are not connected
with existing generations, public bonds become net wealth for existing generations. That
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is, debt policy raises r∗a(0, 0)−τ ∗. Combined with the demand-stimulating effect (Propo-
sition 1), the net incomes of existing generations undoubtedly rise.
Meanwhile, I have the following:
Lemma 3. Debt policy raises the net incomes of future generations at birth if r
¯
∗ < r∗ <
2
3
(ρ+ n) and reduces those if max
¡
r
¯
∗, 2
3
(ρ+ n)
¢
< r∗ ≤ ρ+ n.
Proof. Notice a(s, s) = 0. Differentiating (18) totally and combining it with Proposition
1 yield d(c
∗−τ∗)
dB¯
=
−3r∗
£
r∗− 2
3
(ρ+n)
¤
(2r∗−ρ)P¯ in which B¯ is eliminated by use of (17). Condition 1
ensures the denominator to be positive. The numerator is positive if 0 < r∗ < 2
3
(ρ + n)
and negative if 2
3
(ρ+n) < r∗. Taking into account Condition 1, the proof is completed.¥
The intuitive interpretation of this lemma is as follows. Since d
2c∗
dB¯2
= −2ρn(1−α)
(2r∗−ρ)2P¯
dr∗
dB¯
< 0
is satisfied, I find that the marginal effect on aggregate demand decreases.13 On the other
hand, the relation between τ ∗ and B¯ satisfies
dτ ∗
dB¯
=
B¯
P¯
dr∗
dB¯
+
r∗ − n
P¯
,(21)
d2τ ∗
dB¯2
=
2[3r∗(r∗ − ρ) + ρ(ρ+ nα)]
(2r∗ − ρ)2P¯
dr∗
dB¯
> 0.(22)
The first term in the right-hand side of (21) represents increased tax by a rise in the
interest rate. The second term in the right-hand side of (21) is negative when r∗ < n
but positive when r∗ > n. As illustrated in Figure 2(a) and 2(b), there are two possible
cases concerning the schedule of τ ∗. In the figures, B¯P ≡ M¯ρα [n − ρ(1 + α)] is the B¯
corresponding to r∗ = n, and B¯U ≡ M¯ρα [n + ρ(1 − α)] represents the upper bound of B¯
that gives r∗ = ρ + n. Figure 2(a) depicts the case with a Ponzi scheme (i.e., B¯P > 0),
13The source of this result is that an expansion in consumption raises the interest rate simultaneously.
As c∗ (or r∗) is determined so as to clear (17), a small rise in c∗ (or r∗) is enough to offset an increase in
B¯ when c∗ (or r∗) has a large value.
11
in the words of Weil (1989). At B¯ ∈ (0, B¯P ), r∗ < n is satisfied and lump-sum transfers
exceed seigniorages (τ ∗ < −nM¯
P¯
). At B¯ ∈ (B¯P , B¯U ], I have r∗ > n and τ ∗ > −n M¯
P¯
, so
that τ ∗ is increasing with respect to B¯. Figure 2(b) describes the case without a Ponzi
scheme (i.e., B¯P ≤ 0). In this case, debt issue always involves higher taxes.14
For these reasons, the schedule of c∗− τ ∗ falls into two patterns, Figure 3(a) and 3(b).
In the figures, B¯M ≡ M¯
9ρnα(−2ρ
2 +4n2 +2ρn− 9ρnα) is the B¯ that attains r∗ = 2
3
(ρ+ n),
and satisfies that dB¯
M
dn
= 2
9
M¯(ρ2+2n2)
ρn2α > 0. If population growth is relatively low, I obtain
Figure 3(a) with B¯M ≤ 0, where debt policy always reduces the net incomes of future
generations by levying heavy taxes. On the contrary, if there is enough high population
growth, I get Figure 3(b) with B¯M > 0. Because high population growth brings the
large demand-stimulating effect, debt policy raises the net incomes of future generations
at B¯ ∈ (0, B¯M ). However, the demand-stimulating effect decreases with issuing of bonds.
When B¯ reaches B¯M , debt policy reduces c∗ − τ ∗ like Figure 3(a).
Remark 1. It is easy to prove that B¯P > 0 is not necessary condition but sufficient
condition for B¯M > 0. At B¯ ∈ (B¯P , B¯M ), debt policy raises the net incomes of all
generations despite a non-Ponzi scheme.
Lemma 2 and 3 directly derive the welfare implication:
Theorem 1. If r
¯
∗ < r∗ < 2−α
3−α(ρ+ n), debt policy is Pareto improving.
If max
¡
r
¯
∗, 2−α
3−α(ρ+ n)
¢
< r∗ ≤ ρ+n, debt policy improves welfare of the initial generation
but deteriorates that of future generations.
Proof. See Appendix I.
14An increase in B¯ raises the interest rate at the same time. This is the reason of d
2τ∗
dB¯2
> 0.
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Remark 2. 2−α
3−α(ρ + n) <
2
3
(ρ + n), which reflects the fact that an increase in B¯ brings
the higher interest rate and the higher cost of holding money.
Differently from models with full employment (e.g., Blanchard 1985 and Weil 1989), debt
policy during recessions is Pareto improving by creating more employment if there is high
population growth and the amount of outstanding bonds is relatively small. However, as
public debt accumulates, the demand-stimulating effect declines whereas the cost through
taxes swells. Consequently, when the outstanding issue is large, future generations are
made worse off by heavy taxes. The result is also different from Rankin (1986) where
debt policy during recessions is always beneficial to future generations.
IV. Capital Accumulation
Modigliani’s (1961) original concern is the crowding-out effect of public debt: capital
accumulation is discouraged by raising the interest rate and welfare of future generations
falls. The contribution of Rankin (1986) challenges this negative scenario by showing
that debt issue interferes with investment but totally increases the steady-state output
and welfare. For purpose of comparison, this section pays attention also to the effect on
capital accumulation.
The optimal conditions (13) and (14) generate
r(t) = βθ
"
W¯
(1− β)θP (t)
#β−1
β
.(23)
Since the equilibrium condition of asset markets ensures a(t) = k(t) + B¯
P (t)
+ M¯
P (t)
, the
dynamic equation for c(t) becomes
dc(t)
dt
= [r(t)− ρ]c(t)− ρn(1− α)
"
k(t) +
B¯
P (t)
+
M¯
P (t)
#
.(24)
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Keeping y(t) = r(t)k(t)β in mind, the equilibrium condition of the commodity market is
dk(t)
dt
=
r(t)k(t)
β − c(t)− nk(t).(25)
The Fisher equation and (11) yield
dP (t)
dt
=
"
α
1− α
c(t)P (t)
M¯
− r(t)
#
P (t).(26)
Equations (23)-(26) constitute the autonomous dynamic system.
Appendix II-A proves that the steady state is uniquely determined if it exists, and is
dynamically stable. The analysis assumes the existence of the steady state. See Appendix
II-B for the mathematical proof of the following argument.
To explain the effect on the steady-state values (c∗, k∗, P ∗), I propose three channels
displayed in Figure 4. By the same logic as Proposition 1, Channel 1 signifies that taking
(r∗, k∗, P ∗) as given in (24), debt policy directly raises c∗. Starting this point, there are two
secondary effects denoted by Channel 2 and 3. From (23) and (26), I find that an increase
in c∗ raises P ∗.15 In turn, r∗ rises from (23) and B¯
P ∗ +
M¯
P ∗ falls. Equation (24) implies
that these secondary effects put downward pressure on c∗ (Channel 2). Equation (25)
shows that there are conflicting effects on k∗: the demand-stimulating effect of Channel 1
directly raises k∗ but indirectly reduces it through raising r∗. I can prove that k∗ totally
falls. Equation (24) implies that this secondary effect puts downward pressure on c∗
(Channel 3). Dynamic stability (Det< 0) ensures that c∗ totally rises through Channel
1—3. I conclude that debt policy increases c∗ and P ∗ and decreases k∗.
Responding to this result, the total effect on the steady-state output, y∗ = c∗ + nk∗,
is ambiguous. When the prevailing interest rate is relatively low (i.e., r∗ < nβ(3β−2)
2β−1 ),
15This result depends on β ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
. If β exceeds 12 , an increase in c
∗ reduces P ∗. Then, the total
effects are non-positive on c∗, ambiguous on k∗, and non-negative on P ∗.
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the marginal crowding-out effect is large and debt policy is harmful to aggregate output.
Modigliani’s (1961) scenario holds true in this case: debt policy reduces future aggregate
output through crowding out investment. However, the total effect including a change in
taxes is much more important. Assuming that the economy is always in steady state, I
obtain the welfare implication.
Proposition 2. If max(ρ, nβ) ≤ r∗ < 2−3β−α(1−β)
3−4β−α(1−β)(ρ + n), debt policy is beneficial to all
generations. If max
³
ρ, nβ, 2−3β−α(1−β)
3−4β−α(1−β)(ρ+ n)
´
≤ r∗ ≤ ρ+n, debt policy improves welfare
of the initial generation and deteriorates that of future generations.
Proof. See Appendix II-B.
Remark 3. 2−3β−α(1−β)
3−4β−α(1−β)(ρ + n) <
2−α
3−α(ρ+ n), which reflects the fact that an increase in
B¯ accompanies the negative effect through crowding out investment.
Basically, the implication of Theorem 1 is inherited even if capital accumulation is in-
corporated. Although there is the possibility that aggregate output drops, the economy
is in dynamic-inefficiency at low levels of the interest rate. Therefore, if there is high
population growth and the amount of outstanding bonds is small, debt finance improves
welfare of all generations whether aggregate output drops or not.
V. Conclusion
The present paper develops an overlapping-generations model with nominal wage
rigidities and examines the welfare effects of debt policy during recessions. Further issues
of public debt stimulate aggregate consumption demand and create employment. In so
doing, future generations face both this beneficial employment effect and higher taxes. As
15
public debt accumulates, the beneficial effect gradually declines whereas the harmful ef-
fect steadily swells. If the outstanding issue is already large, heavy taxes lower the welfare
of future generations. In contrast, if the outstanding issue is relatively small and there is
high population growth, the beneficial effect dominates the harmful effect and debt policy
is Pareto improving. These welfare implications are different from the results obtained
in both the Blanchard-Weil model with full employment and the Diamond model with
unemployment.
Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 1
Differentiating (20) totally yields
dU(0, 0)
dB¯
=
1
ρ[r∗a(0, 0) + c∗ − τ ∗]
d[r∗a(0, 0) + c∗ − τ ∗]
dB¯
− αρr∗
dr∗
dB¯
,
dU(s, s)
dB¯
=
1
ρ(c∗ − τ ∗)
d(c∗ − τ ∗)
dB¯
− αρr∗
dr∗
dB¯
for ∀s > 0.
Rewrite r∗a(s, s) + c∗ − τ ∗ as a function of r∗ and B¯ by using (11) and (18). Eliminate
B¯ from the result and Lemma 2 by use of (17). Utilizing these results, Lemma 1, and 3,
the welfare effect of a change in B¯ is calculated as
dU(0, 0)
dB¯
=
n(2− α)
ρ[a(0, 0) + h(0, 0)](2r∗ − ρ)P¯
> 0,
dU(s, s)
dB¯
=
−(3− α)
£
r∗ − 2−α
3−α(ρ+ n)
¤
ρh(s, s)(2r∗ − ρ)P¯ for ∀s > 0.
The former equation is strictly positive. The latter equation is positive if 0 < r∗ <
2−α
3−α(ρ+n) and negative if
2−α
3−α(ρ+n) < r∗. Taking account of Condition 1 completes the
proof. ¥
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Appendix II
A. Steady State and Dynamic System
From (23)-(26), the steady state is, after tedious manipulations, characterized by
Φ(r∗) ≡ r∗3 − (ρ+ nβ)r∗2 − ρnαB¯ + (1− β)M¯
M¯
r∗ + ρn2αβ B¯ + M¯
M¯
= 0.
r∗ must satisfy the following conditions: (i) r∗ ≥ ρ, which is required for c∗ ≥ 0 from
(24); (ii) r∗ ≥ nβ, which is required for k∗ ≥ 0 from (25); (iii) r∗ ≤ ρ + n, which is the
non-negativity constraint of individual consumption. These conditions are summarized
as
Condition 2. max(ρ, nβ) ≤ r∗ ≤ ρ+ n.
Since Φ(0) = ρn2αβ B¯+M¯
M¯
> 0 and Φ(nβ) = −ρn2(1−α)β2 < 0, r∗ is uniquely determined
if it exists.
The dynamic system linearized around the steady state is


dc(t)
dt
dk(t)
dt
dP (t)
dt


=


r∗ − ρ −ρn(1− α) 1−αα
M¯
P ∗2
h
1−β
β r
∗2 + ρnα B¯+M¯
M¯
i
−1 r∗−nββ
1−α
α
M¯
P ∗2
1−β
β
r∗2
r∗−nβ
α
1−α
P ∗2
M¯
0 2β−1β r
∗




c(t)− c∗
k(t)− k∗
P (t)− P ∗


.
For this coefficient matrix,
Trace = 3r∗ − (ρ+ n),
Det = −1− ββ2
r∗
r∗ − nβψ(r
∗) < 0
in which B¯ is eliminated by use of the above steady-state condition. The function ψ(r∗)
is given by
ψ(r∗) ≡ 2r∗3 − (ρ+ 4nβ)r∗2 + 2nβ(ρ+ nβ)r∗ − ρn2αβ2.
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Det< 0 is proved as follows. The first derivative of ψ(r∗) is dψ(r
∗)
dr∗ = 2(r
∗−nβ)[3r∗− (ρ+
nβ)]. First, consider the case where ρ+nβ
3
< nβ. Because I have ψ(nβ) = ρn2(1−α)β2 > 0,
ψ(r∗) > 0 is satisfied within Condition 2. Next, consider the case where ρ+nβ
3
≥ nβ. Since
ρ+nβ
3
< ρ is satisfied, it is sufficient to show ψ(r∗) > 0 for r∗ ≥ ρ. I have ψ(ρ) =
ρ(ρ− nβ)2 + ρn2β2(1− α) > 0. Resultantly, ψ(r∗) is always positive within Condition 2
and hence I get Det< 0.
As k(0) is predetermined and c(0) and P (0) are not, the steady state is dynamically
stable: the dynamic path is either saddle-point stable or indeterminacy. In the case of
saddle-point stability, divergent paths are inconsistent with the optimality of individual
consumers.
B. Comparative Statics
Differentiating the steady-state conditions totally, the steady-state effect of debt policy
is obtained as
dc∗
dB¯
=
ρn(1− α)(2β − 1)r∗(r∗ − nβ)
β2P ∗Det ≥ 0,
dk∗
dB¯
=
β2[r∗ − n(2β − 1)]
(2β − 1)(r∗ − nβ)2
dc∗
dB¯
≤ 0,
dP ∗
dB¯
= − β
(2β − 1)r∗
α
1− α
P ∗2
M¯
dc∗
dB¯
≥ 0.
As explained in the text, Det< 0 and the restriction on β produce the above signs. From
these results, I get the effect on the steady-state output, y∗ = c∗ + nk∗:
dy∗
dB¯
=
r∗
(r∗ − nβ)2
"
r∗ − nβ(3β − 2)
2β − 1
#
dc∗
dB¯
≥ 0 if r∗ ≥ nβ(3β − 2)
2β − 1 .
By use of w∗x∗ = (1−β)y∗, the restriction on β, and (15), the effect on the steady-state
net wage income w∗x∗ − τ ∗ is derived as
d(w∗x∗ − τ ∗)
dB¯
=
(3− 4β)r∗
£
r∗ − 2−3β
3−4β (ρ+ n)
¤
ρn(1− α)(2β − 1)
dc∗
dB¯
≥ 0 if r∗ ≤ 2− 3β
3− 4β (ρ+ n).
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Assume that the economy is always in steady state. Following the similar procedure
to Theorem 1, I obtain the welfare effect:
dU(0, 0)
dB¯
=
1
ρ[a(0, 0) + h(0, 0)]
−[2− 3β − α(1− β)]
ρ(1− α)(2β − 1)
dc∗
dB¯
> 0,
dU(s, s)
dB¯
=
1
ρh(s, s)
[3− 4β − α(1− β)]
h
r∗ − 2−3β−α(1−β)
3−4β−α(1−β)(ρ+ n)
i
ρn(1− α)(2β − 1)
dc∗
dB¯
for ∀s > 0.
Notice that 3 − 4β > 2 − 3β > α(1 − β). dU(s,s)
dB¯
is positive if r∗ ≤ 2−3β−α(1−β)
3−4β−α(1−β)(ρ + n)
and negative otherwise. Taking into account Condition 2, the proof of Proposition 2 is
completed.
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r∗0 Θ
dr(t)
dt
r(t)
−ρnα B¯+M¯
M¯
1
2
ρ ρ
Figure 1: Aggregate Dynamics
τ ∗
B¯
0
−nM¯
P¯
B¯P
(1−α)
α
M¯
P¯
(ρ+ n)
B¯U
Figure 2(a): B¯P > 0
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τ ∗
B¯
0
−n M¯
P¯ ∗
B¯P
(1−α)
α
M¯
P¯
(ρ+ n)
B¯U
Figure 2(b): B¯P ≤ 0
0
B¯
c∗ − τ ∗
B¯M
B¯U
Figure 3(a): B¯M ≤ 0
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0
B¯
c∗ − τ ∗
B¯M
B¯U
Figure 3(b): B¯M > 0
B¯ ↑ c∗ ↑ (Channel 1)
P ∗ ↑
r∗ ↑
B¯
P ∗ +
M¯
P ∗ ↓
c∗ ↓
r∗ ↑
k∗ ↓
k∗ ↓
k∗ ↑
c∗ ↓ (Channel 3)
(Channel 2)
Figure 4: Channels
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